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1. Introduction 
 
 
In Philip K. Dick’s short story, Minority Report, (1991) three mutants with the ability to 
predict the future of the next two weeks to a high degree of accuracy are used to by the 
Department of Precrime to arrest and detain would-be offenders before they get a chance 
to carry out the actual crime.  This scenario raises the question of whether the Department 
is ethically justified in treating citizens this way.   
A desert theorist, namely someone who thinks that the authorities have a duty to 
give citizens what they deserve, may argue that a citizen who is detained in order to 
prevent him from committing a crime he would otherwise commit, is ipso facto innocent 
of that crime.  Since such preventive detention is not punishment but imposes a burden 
upon the innocent detainee, the authorities have a duty to compensate him or at least 
ensure that his life is only minimally inconvenienced.  In Dick’s scenario, the mutants’ 
predictions include the specific future time of the would-be crime.  So once the citizen 
has been detained longer than that time, it is logically impossible for him to commit the 
crime that was predicted.  Since there is no point in detaining a citizen in order to prevent 
a crime that he can no longer commit, that citizen should now be released.  If the citizen 
has been punished at all, he can only have been punished for a past intention to commit 
the crime.  Such crimes would include the planning of a burglary but would exclude 
crimes of passion.  In this respect his incarceration will not be preventive detention but 
will impose a burden upon the citizen for a period that he deserves for having planned the 
would-be crime.  Once that period has expired, he should be released.  The desert theorist 
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now faces the task of deciding how to balance or combine these periods of incarceration, 
one as punishment for planning and the other as preventive detention.   
By contrast, a utilitarian response will differ in two ways. Firstly, the utilitarian 
will say that the authorities have a duty to do whatever it takes to maximize general 
benefit to society, one that may override any duty to the innocent detainee.  For example, 
given that compensating the detainee for his period of detention would cause general 
unhappiness or social unrest among other citizens to a degree that outweighs the 
unhappiness of the detainee, the utilitarian must withhold compensation, even while 
acknowledging that the detainee is innocent of the would-be crime.  Secondly, the 
utilitarian will naturally justify punishment in terms of deterrence.  So he may justify the 
detention as burden that deters others from committing similar crimes or even deters 
others from planning to commit them.  He may even claim that the detention will deter 
the detainee himself from committing crimes other than the one predicted or deter him 
from forming the intention to do so.      
 Dick’s scenario may be seen as a thought experiment that sharpens differences 
between a desert theorist of punishment and a deterrence theorist.  The thought 
experiment does not provide a basis for deciding in favour of one or the other of the 
theorists.  But we can make the example a little more fantastic.  Suppose now that the 
mutants can also see that the Department of Precrime will not only remain powerless to 
prevent the crime but will be powerless to punish the offender after he has committed it.  
For example, suppose that the mutants let the Department know the following facts:  
(1)  Whatever the Department does, a specific citizen (call him Charles) will very 
likely commit a brutal assault upon an innocent victim tomorrow at an unknown 
location.  
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(2)  Having committed the assault, Charles will evade punishment for once and for all.  
 (for example by leaving the jurisdiction of the Department) 
  
Suppose further that the Department has technology to identify Charles and  
inflict pain him while he remains within its jurisdiction yet that fails to give it a way to 
locate or apprehend him. For example, suppose that all citizens have receivers  
implanted in their brains that, so long as a citizen remains within the jurisdiction the  
Department, enables it to identify that citizen and transmit a signal that causes him  
physical pain.  We might even suppose that the implant gives the Department a way of  
constructing a visual depiction of the wearer’s suffering that may then be broadcast to 
the general population as a deterrent.  Nonetheless this technology is unable to tell the 
Department where that citizen is located.   
Although fantastic, this scenario is coherent.  And it confronts us with an  
interesting moral question.  Let us grant for the sake of argument that punishing Charles 
(by inflicting pain upon him) after the assault, would have been justifiable.  Since the 
Department cannot ‘post-punish’ Charles, should it not now ‘pre-punish’ him by 
inflicting physical pain upon him today, rather than not punishing him at all?   In non-
fantastic, ordinary cases, we might judge that punishing someone for a crime that he will 
commit is wrong because we cannot be reasonably certain that he will commit it.  In the 
scenario we have envisaged this uncertainty is removed.  Confronted with our new 
scenario, most will judge that it is wrong for the Department to punish Charles today for 
the crime he will commit tomorrow and that what makes it wrong is not just the fact that 
we cannot we reasonably certain that he will commit it1.  As I will show, both the desert 
and deterrence theorist may give different reasons in support of this judgment.  There are 
good and bad reasons on both sides.  But it turns out that all of the good reasons available 
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to the deterrence theorist are subordinate to those of the desert theorist.  So the fantastic 
example reveals that the desert theorist has the advantage.   
The structure of the paper is as follows.  I first defend the possibility of pre-
punishment against two objections.  I then consider three reasons available to the desert 
theorist why pre-punishment is wrong: that that pre-punishment constitutes a lack of 
respect for the offender’s autonomy to make morally significant choices, that it entitles 
the future offender to commit the crime and that it is always a case of punishing someone 
who is innocent.  It turns out that only the last of these is a good reason.  I then show that 
the deterrence theorist would be wrong to say that pre-punishment can have no deterrent 
effect.  But I argue that he should concede firstly, that in pre-punishment, the aim of 
deterrence is immoral, secondly, that he has no rational justification for thinking the 
offender will be deterred, thirdly, that he must unfairly impose a severer punishment than 
that proportional to the social cost of the future crime and finally, that he must say 
counterfactually that if there were a way to prevent the crime, it would be wrong to do so.        
I show that these reasons for thinking pre-punishment is wrong presuppose an appeal to  
desert.  Consistently with my claim that there is no pre-deserved punishment, I  
conclude by showing that Feldman’s (1995) apparent examples of pre-deserved  
charity, reward and apology are spurious. 
 
2. The legitimacy of the term ‘pre-punishment’ 
 
Someone might object that the scenario we have considered is incoherent because an 
essential part of the meaning of the word ‘punish’ is that punishment is for a past offence 
(Cottingham 1992, 662).  This argument should remind us of an older utilitarian response 
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to examples given by the desert theorist in which following the principle of utility 
commits us to punishing the innocent.  The utilitarian might respond by insisting that 
such cases cannot arise, since by definition, punishment is not punishment of the innocent 
(Quinton 1969, 58-59).  So since there can be no cases of punishing the innocent, there 
can be no cases of punishing the innocent which the principle of utility must bring about.  
But it is now widely accepted that this definitional manoeuvre misses the real issue (Ten 
1987, 14-17).  The mere insistence on the definition begs the question against a desert 
theorist who holds that there is no reason why the term ‘punish’ cannot be extended to 
apply to the innocent.  Likewise, even if our use of the verb ‘punish’ is normally 
backward-looking, that may simply be because we have not yet considered forward-
looking cases like that of the highly accurate mutant predictors. So the mere insistence 
that punishment is essentially backward looking just begs the question of whether such a 
case is possible.  Whether suffering is inflicted on those who are innocent or on those 
who are future offenders, the real issue is not whether we should call the infliction 
‘punishment’ but rather whether it is morally justifiable. 
 There is also a second argument that pre-punishment is logically impossible.  This 
is that because future offences cannot take place now, there is literally nothing for which 
we can pre-punish, so since punishment is always punishment for something, pre-
punishment is never punishment at all. The invalidity of this argument is demonstrated by 
a parallel argument against the possibility of pre-payment. It is an obvious mistake to 
argue that since services rendered in the future cannot be rendered now, there is literally 
nothing for which we can pay, so since payment is always payment for something, pre-
payment is never payment at all.  Although there is a sense in which there is now nothing 
for which we are paying, it does not follow that we are now paying for nothing. 
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3.  The argument from autonomy  
 
A broadly Kantian argument that the Department would be wrong to pre-punish Charles 
is that doing so constitutes a lack of respect for the offender’s autonomy or capacity to 
make morally significant choices. For example, Smilansky objects to pre-punishment on 
the grounds that it fails to acknowledge the possibility that the person punished will make 
a choice that constitutes ‘last-minute moral improvement’ (1994, 52), namely to refrain 
from committing the crime.  Likewise Feldman writes (1995, 77): 
 
Consider a typical case in which it seems quite likely that a certain person will 
commit some crime.  We think he will deserve the legally mandated punishment 
only if he will  be responsible for the crime and we think that he will be 
responsible for the crime only if he will commit it ‘freely’; and we think that if he 
will commit it ‘freely’, then it cannot yet be quite certain that he will commit it.  
There must still be some possibility that he will decide not to commit it.  So we 
insist upon a legal system that prohibits punishment-in-advance.  
But the Department’s reasonable certainty that Charles will assault his victim tomorrow 
does not entail that Charles will have no choice tomorrow whether or not to assault him.  
All that it does entail is that the Department is reasonably certain of the way that Charles 
will use that choice, namely to assault his victim.  Even if the mutants’ predictions were 
infallible so that Department knew that Charles would assault his victim, this would still 
not rule out Charles’ ability to choose tomorrow not to assault his victim.  Of course it is 
logically necessary that if the Department knows that Charles will assault his victim 
tomorrow then that is what Charles will do tomorrow.  But this necessity lies only in the 
connection between what is known of tomorrow and what is true of tomorrow.  It would 
be fallacious to conclude that since the Department knows that Charles will assault his 
victim tomorrow then it is logically necessary that he will do so tomorrow.  This fallacy 
is demonstrated by noting that although it is logically necessary that if Smith is a 
bachelor then he is unmarried, we cannot legitimately conclude that since Smith is a 
bachelor, it is logically necessary that he is unmarried.  Moreover, if the Department’s 
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knowledge that Charles will assault his victim tomorrow did entail that Charles will not 
make a free choice tomorrow then it would be reasonable to claim that its knowledge that 
he committed the assault yesterday entails that he did not make a free choice yesterday 
either.  It is not as if the Department’s knowledge, foreknowledge or correct prediction of 
Charles’s assault forces him to commit it.  Rather, Charles’s making the choice he does 
or will make is merely a necessary condition of the Department’s knowing or 
foreknowing it.  Likewise, just as Charles’s choice yesterday to commit the assault is 
what allows the Department to know that he has so chosen, so Charles’s choosing to 
tomorrow to commit it is what allows the Department to correctly predict that he will 
commit it.     
 
4. The argument from entitlement to crime  
 
A desert theorist might claim that the reason why pre-punishment is wrong is that it is 
like purchasing an indulgence for future sin.  More precisely, this is the claim that by pre-
punishing Charles for assaulting his victim tomorrow, the Department has given him the 
right to assault his victim tomorrow2.  This claim might be supported by a commercial 
analogy.  The desert theory sees punishment as payment, and so pre-punishment is a kind 
of pre-payment.  But just as a person who has pre-paid for goods has a right to them, so 
in being pre-punished, Charles has the right to assault his victim tomorrow.  Thus it can 
never be justifiable to pre-punish, because it is always wrong to punish someone for 
doing what he is entitled to do. 
New objects that punishment is not like payment, thus the commercial analogy is 
misleading.  He points out that the purchaser has a right to his goods, because he has 
made an implicit or explicit contract with the vendor to receive them upon payment.  
However, New claims that no such contract exists between the offender and the 
authorities (1992, 38).  But this objection is not decisive.  For some desert theorists might 
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hold that there is an implicit social contract between the offender and the authorities; all 
members of society, as potential offenders, have contracted to submit to punishment for 
an offence if they commit one.  
We could instead object that the desert theorist’s conclusion – that it can never be 
justifiable to pre-punish – does not follow from the fact that it is always wrong to punish 
someone for doing what he is entitled to do.  For although it is always wrong to punish 
someone for doing what he is entitled to do, that is because the person in question already 
has the right to do what he is then punished for doing.  In the case of pre-punishment 
however, things are different, for there, according to the argument from entitlement, the 
person who is pre-punished only acquires the right to commit the crime after he has been 
punished and so was not, at the time of punishment, already entitled to do what he was 
punished for doing.  The desert theorist could reply that there is a different reason why it 
is wrong to entitle Charles to commit the assault tomorrow, namely that so doing will 
entitle Charles to assault his victim.  But since his victim deserves not to be assaulted, it 
is wrong for Charles to assault him and because it is wrong to entitle someone to do what 
is itself wrong, pre-punishment is wrong.  But this reply is incoherent, since it is 
impossible to give anyone the moral right to do what is morally wrong.  So there can no 
such entitlement. 
 A better objection to the claim that pre-punishing Charles for assaulting his 
would-be victim entitles him to commit the assault is found by comparison with post-
punishment.  For if pre-punishing Charles for assaulting his victim tomorrow now entitles 
him to assault that victim tomorrow then post-punishing him for having assaulted a 
victim yesterday must now entitle him to have assaulted that victim yesterday.  But this 
consequence is absurd for two reasons.  First it involves changing the past.  Secondly, it 
entails that no form of post-punishment whatever may be morally justified, since it is 
always wrong to punish someone for doing what he was entitled to have done.   
 8
 The temptation to think that pre-punishing Charles for the assault entitles him to 
commit it, arises from the correct observation that pre-punishing him entitles him from 
immunity from further punishment if he does commit it, as is highly likely.  Charles 
cannot be fairly both pre- and post-punished from the same crime, for nobody can be 
given fair and full punishment more than once for the same crime.  But it does not follow 
from this that pre-punishing Charles gives him the right to commit the assault.  Charles 
may have a moral right to immunity from post-punishment, but that is because this 
immunity is not wrong, but indeed only fair.  But nobody, including Charles, may have a 
moral right to do what is morally wrong. 
 
5. The argument from innocence  
 
Although the arguments from autonomy and from entitlement to crime are available to a 
desert theorist, neither is viable. But there is a better reason that the desert theorist should 
endorse why pre-punishment is wrong.  This is that pre-punishment is always a case of 
punishing someone who is innocent.  For if the Department punishes Charles today for 
the assault he will very likely commit only tomorrow then surely today Charles is 
innocent of the assault.  The desert theorist holds that a person deserves to suffer in 
proportion to his moral culpability and so will say that Charles deserves no suffering 
today3. 
 New objects to this argument.  He agrees that it is wrong to punish an innocent 
person but denies that Charles is innocent when he is pre-punished.  He claims that there 
are two forms of the principle that it is wrong to punish an innocent person (1992, 37): 
 
The first form is that it is wrong to punish someone for an offence which he never 
commits, the second that it is wrong to punish someone for an offence which all 
involved know he intends to and will commit after his punishment.   
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New thinks it is the first form of the principle we should uphold, not the second.  In other 
words, he accepts the principle that 
 
A person is guilty of a crime today if that person intends today to commit it and 
will commit it in the future   
We may discount the reference to the person’s intention to commit the crime because that 
intention lies in the present and so may only be post-punished by the Department.  
Having done so, only the guilt of the person in respect of the future commission of the 
crime remains.  Moreover, New would want his principle to include future crimes of 
passion in which a person will commit a spur-of-the moment assault without having 
formed any prior intention at all to do so, let alone having formed it today.  The basic 
idea behind New’s re-definition of guilt is that a person is guilty in respect of the guilt of 
his future selves, but a future self may be guilty of a crime that is not premeditated.  So 
New’s principle must read: 
 
A person is guilty of a crime today if that person will commit it in the future   
But now the serious problem with this redefinition of guilt is that it makes it impossible 
to give a coherent account of the idea of moral decay.  For if we accept that someone is 
now guilty of the crimes of his future selves, then we are forced to say that nobody can 
ever pass from a state of relative innocence into a state of relative guilt.  Thus a baby is as 
guilty as any of its future selves, since any crime it commits in the future will disqualify it 
from innocence of that crime at any earlier point in time.  So there is no good reason to 
abandon our ordinary perspective on guilt that 
 
A person is guilty of a crime today just in case that person has already committed 
it  
 
according to which, Charles is innocent of the crime for which the Department pre-
punishes him.  So the argument that pre-punishment is wrong because it is always 
punishment of the innocent, is a strong argument after all. 
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6. The argument from failure of deterrence  
 
A deterrence theorist might be tempted to say that pre-punishing Charles is morally 
unjustified because it can have no deterrent effect.  But as New points out, ‘in pre- as 
much as in post-punishment the penalty imposed may deter potential offenders, as also 
the actual offender, from committing other offences in the future’ (1992, 38).  If the 
Department broadcasts a visual depiction of Charles’s suffering, this may well deter other 
citizens from planning similar assaults by letting them know that if they do so then they 
too will be pre-punished.  Nonetheless the deterrence theorist might insist that the 
deterrent effect of prepunishment is necessarily more restricted than that of post-
punishment, because it cannot deter the offender from committing the very same crime 
for which he is being punished.  New assumes that this claim is true, but points out that it 
is also true of post-punishment (1992, 38).  Nothing, including post-punishing Charles, 
can now deter him from having assaulted his victim yesterday, unless we accept 
backward causation.  Thus even if it were true that pre-punishing Charles cannot deter 
him from assaulting his victim tomorrow, this would not pose a special difficulty for pre-
punishment.  But New is wrong to assume that Charles cannot be deterred from 
committing the very crime for which he has been punished.  Admittedly, since the 
Department is reasonably certain that he will commit the crime, it should be reasonably 
certain that pre-punishing him will not deter him from committing it.  Nonetheless it 
might still be mistaken.  Thus it does not follow that Charles will not be deterred from 
committing the crime tomorrow.  We have already established that there is no reason to 
deny that Charles still has a genuine choice tomorrow whether to assault his victim.  And 
since the Department’s prediction might be mistaken, Charles might use that choice to 
refrain from assaulting his victim. 
 Indeed there seems to be an example where pre-punishing Charles does deter him 
from committing the very crime for which he has been punished.  Suppose that the 
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unpleasantness of his pre-punishment leads him to reflect on his would-be criminal 
career.  He recognizes that since pre-punishment has been instituted, he will not continue 
to evade punishment.  He also forms the reasonable expectation of further doses of pre-
punishment for each of the assaults he had intended to carry out each day after tomorrow. 
Although he knows that he has nothing to lose by assaulting his victim tomorrow, he 
might know himself well enough to see that it is now in his interest to drop the habit.  For 
example if he knows that the thrill of assaulting an innocent victim on any one occasion 
will reinforce the compulsion to assault other innocent victims, he may sensibly reason 
that his best course of action is to desist immediately from any assaults whatever. 
 
7. Immoral deterrent aim and three other reasons why the deterrence theorist must judge 
pre-punishment wrong     
 
There is a better argument that pre-punishment is wrong that has to do with deterrence.  
Suppose that the pre-punishment is to be justified in terms of deterrence.  Let us now 
look at the Department’s deterrent aim.  In post-punishing Charles for having committed 
an assault, it is trying to deter would-be offenders, including Charles himself, from 
committing the same type of crime after the punishment has been given. This must be 
likewise true of pre-punishment.  Thus in pre-punishing Charles for assaulting his victim 
tomorrow, the Department is trying to deter would-be offenders, including Charles 
himself, from committing similar assaults after the punishment has been given.  But in 
pre-punishment, these offences include the very offence for which Charles has already 
been punished.  If the Department succeeds, then Charles will refrain from assaulting his 
victim tomorrow. So the Department will have punished a person who, by any definition, 
is innocent.  Thus the Department is trying to do something that is morally wrong.  Since 
trying to do something that is morally wrong is itself morally wrong, the Department is 
wrong to pre-punish Charles. 
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 It might be replied that we should describe the Department as only aiming to deter 
Charles from committing assaults on all occasions after that for which he has been 
punished.  But in fact, this isn’t even true of post-punishment.  Suppose that the 
Department punishes Charles for having assaulted his victim the day before yesterday.  
By so doing, it cannot be trying to deter him from assaulting another victim yesterday.  
Moreover, the re-description forces us to say that by pre-punishing Charles, the 
Department is not trying to deter him from committing other assaults before that for 
which he has been punished.  Now the aim of deterrence is much more modest than it 
should be.  This becomes conspicuous if we suppose that Charles has been pre-punished 
for a crime that lies further in the future, or at least, as far as reasonable certainty allows.  
There is now a significant portion of Charles’s would-be criminal career that the 
Department cannot even try to change.  
 A similar argument that pre-punishment is wrong can be given by moral 
reformers. The reformer hopes that punishment for a crime will improve the moral 
character of the criminal to the extent that he will choose to refrain from the same type of 
crime in the future.  But in pre-punishment this becomes the strange hope that the person 
who has been punished will not commit any future crime of the same type, including that 
for which he has been punished.  The most successful form of reformation (or deterrence) 
is that which takes effect as soon as possible after punishment and which lasts as long as 
possible with respect to future opportunities for crime of the same type as that for which 
punishment was given. If the reformer's hope is realized, he has punished an innocent 
person.  
 There is, moreover, a simple reason why pre-punishing Charles will normally fail 
to deter him from committing that very crime.  As we saw above, although pre-punishing 
Charles does not entitle him to commit it tomorrow, it does entitle him to immunity from 
further punishment if he does commit the assault, because nobody can be given fair and 
full punishment more than once for the same crime.  If Charles has faith in the justice of 
 13
the system, he should recognize that he has nothing to fear by assaulting his victim 
tomorrow.   So unless Charles has a special reason for not assaulting his victim tomorrow 
such as breaking a general compulsion to assault innocent victims, pre-punishing him 
will fail disastrously to deter him from assaulting his victim tomorrow.  Thus the 
Department aims to do something, namely deter Charles from committing the assault, 
that it should recognize is likely to fail.  Since the Department has no rational justification 
for thinking Charles will be deterred by pre-punishing him, it has no moral justification 
for doing so either. 
 Suppose that Department’s attempt to deter Charles does fail and Charles assaults 
his victim anyway.  Here a general accounting problem emerges for the deterrence 
theorist.  Since the Department’s aim was to deter Charles from assaulting his victim, 
then the punishment should have been more severe, for clearly it was not an effective 
warning.  Secondly, since the Department is reasonably certain that Charles will assault 
his victim tomorrow, it should be reasonably certain that he will flout the dignity of the 
warning, thereby deepening his culpability.  So the Department should have imposed a 
severer punishment than that thought proportional to the social cost of assaulting an 
innocent victim.  But this is unfair to Charles, since his intention was only to assault his 
victim.        
 Since the Department has already pre-punished Charles for assaulting his victim 
tomorrow, it would even be unfair for it to prevent him from carrying out the assault, for 
then it would have punished someone who is innocent of carrying it out.  By bringing 
about the innocence of a person who has been punished, the Department would have 
brought it about that an innocent person has been punished. To do so is morally wrong.  It 
follows that if the Department’s reasonable certainty that it is powerless to prevent the 
crime were confounded by the unlikely discovery of a way to do so, the Department 
would still be wrong to prevent the crime. By pre-punishing Charles, the Department has 
transformed its practical inability to prevent Charles from committing the crime into an 
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absurd moral inability to do so.  In other words, it has committed itself to saying 
counterfactually that if there were a way to prevent the crime, it would be wrong to so 
prevent it.  But the Department would be incorrect to say this, because it has a duty to 
prevent crime should it be within its power to do so.   
 
8. Why the desert theorist has the edge 
 
Both the desert and the deterrence theorist can find good reasons for judging pre-
punishment wrong.  But the desert theorist enjoys an advantage over the deterrence 
theorist.  The desert theorist should say that pre-punishment is wrong because it is a case 
in which an innocent person is punished, whereas the deterrence theorist should say that 
it is wrong because it aims to bring this case about.  So the deterrence theorist’s position 
is subordinate to that of the desert theorist’s, for unless it were wrong to punish an 
innocent person, it would not be wrong to try to do so.  The other three reasons to which 
the deterrence theorist can appeal for judging prepunishment wrong are likewise 
subordinate to those of desert.  What explains why the Department will probably fail to 
deter Charles from committing the crime for which he is being punished, is his 
recognition of the principle that nobody can be given fair and full punishment more than 
once for the same crime.  This same principle is what transforms the Department’s 
practical inability to prevent the crime into an absurd moral inability to do so.  Yet this 
principle is itself a consequence of the desert theorist’s most fundamental principle that a 
person deserves to suffer in proportion to his moral culpability.  The accounting reason is 
also subordinate, since giving Charles extra punishment for doing something he does not 
intend to do is wrong only because it is undeserved. 
 
 
 
 15
9. Are there any pre-deserts?    
 
If there are ‘pre-deserts’ that is, if someone could now deserve to be treated in a certain 
way because of what that person will do or undergo, then it is natural to think that these 
pre-deserts would extend to punishment.  Feldman thinks that there are cases of pre-
deserved charity, reward and apology and gives apparent examples of each.  Consistently 
with my claim that there are no pre-deserts of punishment, I conclude by showing that 
Feldman’s examples fail to establish any pre-desert.  
In Feldman’s first example, the Make-a-Wish Foundation offers a trip to 
Disneyland to the most deserving sick child, one of which is certain to recover and one of 
which is certain to die.  Feldman holds that  
 
in the absence of any unusual and so far unstated factors, the child with the fatal 
disease would be the more deserving, precisely because he is going to suffer the 
greater misfortune (1995, 73).  
 
But this example is not decisive.  We may just as well describe the child who is certain to 
die as deserving the trip because it is now fatally ill, in which case the desert lies in the 
present, or as deserving it because it has contracted the fatal illness, in which case the 
desert lies in the past.  
His second example is of soldiers about to embark on a suicide mission. Instead 
of decorating the soldiers with medals posthumously, the commanding officer decorates 
them in advance (1995, 73).  Feldman correctly dismisses the objection that the 
commanding officer has only rewarded the pilots for the past act of volunteering for the 
suicide mission, but fails to provide a reason.  The reason might be that in a parallel case 
of post-reward, the commanding officer should bestow a lesser reward upon all those 
who volunteered (by awarding them a less honorific medal) yet reserve a greater reward 
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(the more honorific posthumous medal) to those who had completed the mission. 
Otherwise we would be forced to say that those who volunteered for the mission but 
failed to complete it are as deserving of honour as those who volunteered and succeeded.  
Since completion of the mission is a necessary condition for deserving the greater reward, 
that is what we should say too in the case where the medals are awarded before 
embarking on the mission.   
But non-consequentialists might refuse to accept this claim.  If the moral desert of 
an action is based on the intentions and dispositions of the agent rather than its outcome, 
it seems that there is no basis for pre-reward.  On this view, the success of the mission 
was of importance only because it was evidence of the pilots past willingness and ability 
to complete it.  The pilots do not now deserve to be honoured because they will succeed 
in completing the mission, nor because they have merely volunteered to do so, but 
because they are now ready and able to do so.  On this way of looking at it, if the 
commanding officer is confident that the pilots are now willing and able to complete the 
mission, he should award the medal even if the mission is cancelled due to bad weather.  
But this is not a case of predesert. 
Feldman’s final example is a customs inspector who apologises to a traveler for 
having to search his bags.  Feldman comments 
The inspector is apologizing for something that is about to happen. It is 
reasonable to  suppose that the innocent traveler deserves the apology even 
before his privacy has been violated (1995, 75). 
But it is not clear that the officer giving is giving an apology that the traveler deserves.  
For all the officer knows, the traveler may be carrying contraband.  Thus the officer is 
simply doing his duty in searching the bags and thus invading the traveler’s privacy. 
Since he is doing his duty, he is doing no wrong to the traveler, and since an apology is 
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deserved only in virtue of a wrong, the traveler deserves no apology at all.  The officer’s 
words are merely an expression of regret in the form of an elaborate courtesy.  
 The contrary view of the matter is that the apology is deserved if the traveler is 
innocent of carrying contraband.  But if so, then whether the apology that was made 
before the search was justified, will depend on the outcome of the search. This means that 
the officer would not be justified in giving an unconditional apology. To do so is assure 
the traveler that he will be found innocent, while at the same time searching his bags.  
Such an apology is insincere, and thus undeserved, since offering an insincere apology to 
someone does him a disservice.  Thus the officer should really give the conditional 
apology, ‘If your bags reveal no contraband, then I now apologise for invading your 
privacy’.  But such an apology is incoherent.  Suppose that the search reveals no 
contraband.  Then it follows that the officer has already apologised before the search for 
invading the traveler’s privacy.  But the officer was then in no position to know the 
outcome of the search.  This means that when he made the apology for invading the 
traveler’s privacy, he was then in no position to know that he had made one.  This is 
absurd.  Nobody can genuinely apologise if he is unable to know that he is so doing.  To 
avoid this absurdity, the officer should really say ‘If your bags reveal no contraband, then 
I will apologise for invading your privacy’.  If the bags reveal no contraband then the 
traveler will deserve the apology for having had his privacy invaded.  Clearly this is not a 
case of predesert. 
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Notes 
 
1. An exception is New 1992 who first raises the problem of pre-punishment but 
who thinks that it is not morally wrong. 
  
2. Feldman writes (1995, 77).  
Suppose a person appears at the police station and offers to pay a fine for 
speeding.  She says that she is going to speed later in the day, and wants to 
pay the fine in advance so as to avoid red tape and inconvenience ... To accept 
the money and agree that she deserves the fine would be to acknowledge that 
she is going to speed, and in effect to grant her permission to do so, and this 
the officer cannot do.  
 
3. As Smilansky points out (1990), even the most extreme utilitarian would 
recognise that it is a serious objection to his theory that it has the consequence 
that the innocent may be punished, a recognition evinced by the typical strategy of 
attempting to show that in practice this possibility would hardly ever arise. 
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